he adjusted monetary base is an index that measures the effects on a central bank' s balance sheet of its open market operations, discount window lending, unsterilized foreign exchange market intervention, and changes in statutory reserve requirements. Such an index is important because the long-run path of a monetary economy' s price level is primarily determined by the path of the central bank' s balance sheet, adjusted for the effects of changes in statutory reserve requirements.
The St. Louis adjusted monetary base equals the sum of the monetary (or source) base and the reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM). This article presents a revised measure of the monetary base and a new RAM. The revised measure of the monetary base differs from previous measures by including all Federal Reserve Bank deposits held by domestic depository institutions; previous measures have excluded the aggregate amount of depository institutions' required clearing balance contracts with Federal Reserve Banks. The new RAM recognizes that, since the Monetary Control Act of 1980, an increasing proportion of depository institutions have not significantly changed their demand for base money (vault cash and deposits at Federal Reserve Banks) relative to transactions deposits following changes in statutory reserve requirements. Previous RAM adjustments have assumed that depository institutions would match changes in their statutory required reserves about dollar-for-dollar with changes in their holdings of base money, following a change in reserve-requirement ratios. The new RAM, constructed from fifteen years of weekly data on more than 10,000 individual depository institutions, measures more precisely the change in the amount of base money demanded by depositories following changes in reserverequirement ratios than did previous RAM adjustments based on aggregate data.
THE REVISED MONETARY BASE
The measure of the monetary base that was published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis through September 1996 included most, but not all, deposits at Federal Reserve Banks held by domestic depository institutions. The new measure, presented in this article and published by the Bank since October 1996, includes all such deposits. The revision increases the level of the base by an amount that varies from zero in 1980 up to about $6 billion in 1994 and 1996. Sources and uses of high-powered money for the U.S. economy in December 1995 are shown in Table 1. 1 Most of the high-powered money supplied by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury is represented by currency in circulation and the deposits of domestic financial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks; together, these constitute the monetary base. 2 The old measure of the St. Louis monetary base (line 6) equals the sum of currency in circulation outside the Treasury and Federal Reserve (line 6a) plus the "reserve balances" of depository institutions (line Richard G. Anderson is an assistant vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Robert H. Rasche is a professor of economics at Michigan State University and a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We thank Cindy Gleit and Daniel Steiner for excellent research assistance. We also thank the staff of the Division of Monetary Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for providing the data used in this article.
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6b). Reserve balances, measured by subtracting the aggregate amount of depository institutions' required clearing balance contracts from their aggregate Federal Reserve deposits, is an accounting concept intended to measure the aggregate amount of high-powered money available to support deposit expansion. Uses of highpowered money other than as the monetary base, including their use to satisfy required clearing balance contracts, were about $25 billion in December 1995 (line 7).
The new measure of the monetary base (line 8) equals the sum of currency in circulation (line 8a) plus all Federal Reserve deposits held by domestic depository institutions (line 8b). The new measure recognizes the similarity between the Federal Reserve deposits classified as reserves balances (line 6b) and those classified as held to satisfy required clearing balance contracts (line 7d). Both categories of deposits are used by depository institutions to settle interbank payments, and both are available to satisfy legal reserve requirements (albeit perhaps at the cost of failing to satisfy a required clearing balance contract). Including in the monetary base those Federal Reserve deposits putatively held to satisfy required clearing balance contracts increases the amount of Federal Reserve deposits in the base by about one-fourth.
Our new measure of the monetary base is suggested by the definition of Balbach and Burger (1976): ... (the monetary base) can therefore be identified in any monetary system Brunner (1961) excluded these deposits. The measures constructed by Cagan (1965) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963, appendix A) include (estimates of) these deposits.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1996
by ascertaining and summing the following: 1. those assets which the consolidated banking sector uses to settle interbank debt; and 2. those items, aside from bank liabili ties, which are used as money; and by the definition of the Advisory Commission on Monetary Statistics (1976, p. 8 
):
With respect to monetary aggregates, one basis for defining such a total is to regard money as corresponding to assets that are generally used to discharge obligations and that are not the explicit liability of nongovernmental entities in the society. Traditionally, such assets have corresponded to specie. In the United States today they correspond primarily to the non-interest-bearing fiat issues of the ultimate monetary authority. The terms "high-powered money" and "monetary base" have been used to refer to this total. We shall refer to it as "the base." For the United States today the base includes all currency outside the Federal Reserve and the Treasury plus all bank deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.
Although broader than the old measure it replaces, the new measure of the monetary base excludes an important asset that these definitions suggest should be included: the amount of intraday credit, in the form of Federal Reserve deposits, used by banks for interbank payments. During 1994, such intraday deposits averaged approximately $50 billion, or nearly twice the close-of-business-day amount of Federal Reserve deposits included in the monetary base (see Richards, 1995 Richards, , p. 1066 . The major barrier to inclusion of intraday deposits is the lack of timely published data: close-of-business deposit levels are published weekly on the Board of Governors' H.4.1 statistical release, while intraday credit is not published in any release. 3 The need to revise the measure of the monetary base arises from changes in U.S. financial markets since the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The Act significantly changed the demand for Federal Reserve deposits. Prior to the Act, almost all deposits at Federal Reserve Banks were held by member banks of the Federal Reserve System. 4 Banks used these balances both to satisfy reserve requirements and to make payments on behalf of customers. For most member banks, the latter came "free": the amount of reserves that they were required to hold against deposits was more than sufficient to satisfy any demands arising from interbank payments (perhaps with some intraday Federal Reserve overdraft credit). Nonmember banks and thrifts, lacking access to the Federal Reserve' s books for final settlement of payments, made interbank payments and settled checks through correspondent accounts at member banks.
The Monetary Control Act made nonmember institutions subject to Federal Reserve System reserve requirements and, at the same time, gave them direct access to the payments system through deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks (see Gilbert and Summers, 1996) . Because the new reserve requirements were phased in for these institutions over an eight-year period, many initially found their vault cash more than sufficient to satisfy the requirements. Holding only small amounts of Federal Reserve deposits, some institutions found that overdrafts on Federal Reserve accounts became a problem (see Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1981, pp. 247-49 and December 1982, p. 756 Feinman (1993) and Hilton, Cohen and Koonmen (1993) .
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to defray charges for Federal Reserve priced services such as check clearing and wire transfers. A clear statement of the rationale for the exclusion of required clearing balances from the current measure of the monetary base is provided by Gilbert (1983) No penalties are imposed for small deficiencies on voluntary clearing balance contracts, and larger shortfalls are penalized at only a 2 or 4 percent annual interest rate (see Stevens, 1993) . Deficiencies relative to required reserves are subject to significant penalties and "administrative counseling," while comparable deficiencies relative to a clearing requirement are subject to minimal penalties. An institution that sometimes has been forced to borrow at either the discount window or a penalty federal funds rate to cover reserve deficiencies may find the required clearing balance account comforting.
By 1985, about 4500 institutions had clearing balance contracts, totaling approximately $1.2 billion (Figure 1 ). These numbers were about the same in the third quarter of 1990, before the December 1990 reduction in reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits and certain other liabilities. Two years later, during the third quarter of 1992, the amount of contracted required clearing balances had nearly tripled to approximately $4.5 billion while the number of institutions had increased to about 4700. Including the amount of required clearing balance contracts in the monetary base is not without objection. Some depository institutions seem to adjust the size of their contract inversely to changes in the federal funds rate, seeking perhaps to generate only enough earnings credits to pay for their use of the Federal Reserve' s priced services. For these institutions, the demand for Federal Reserve deposits may be highly interest-elastic and largely unrelated to either liquidity management or lending decisions. If so, argue some analysts, required clearing balances should be excluded from the monetary base.
Relatively simple macroeconomic analysis shows that this argument has no implications for definition or measurement of the adjusted monetary base. In previous articles, we have explored the dependence of most money multiplier components, such as k and e, on economic variables such as interest rates and income (Anderson and Rasche, 1982; Anderson, Johannes and Rasche, 1983) . Although it seems likely that including required clearing balances in the monetary base will increase the interest elasticity of the excess reserve ratio, e, this increase has no implications for the importance of the adjusted base as a policy indicator in models where changes in the adjusted monetary base are transmitted to the economy solely through changes in a monetary aggregate, M. In these models, the role of the adjusted monetary base as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy is independent of the size of the elasticity of multiplier components such as k (the nonbank public' s desired ratio of currency to checkable deposits) and e (depository institutions' desired ratio of excess reserves to checkable deposits) with respect to 10 In this article, we make an additional change to the Burger and Rasche methodology. They proposed that a single RAM adjustment be used in creating the adjusted monetary base. We adopt the proposal of Tatom (1980) , who observed that the RAM adjustment was appropriate only for changes in reserve-requirement ratios within a given overall structure of requirements.
variables such income and interest rates. For further discussion, see Anderson and Rasche (1996b) .
Comparison of U.S. and foreign payments systems reinforces our decision to include the aggregate amount of required clearing balance contracts in the monetary base. In some countries, depository institutions' need to settle interbank payments in central bank deposits has been cited as a justification for effective, binding statutory reserve requirements (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994, pp. 70-80) . In countries without statutory reserve requirements, all central bank deposits held by depository institutions are clearing balances; yet, such deposits play an important role in the central bank' s monetary policy (see Bank of Canada, 1987 , 1989 , 1991 Bank for International Settlements, 1993) . Andersen and Jordan (1968) included an adjustment for "reserves released by changes in reserve requirements." The adjustment, constructed as suggested by Brunner (1961) , added to the monetary base at each date the cumulative dollar amount by which past changes in reserve requirements had changed the level of required reserves. Although each change in reserve requirements was viewed as absorbing or liberating a certain dollar amount of required reserves, these amounts depended only on the amount of reservable deposits on the date of the reduction: They did not vary in later periods with changes in the levels of reservable deposits.
ADJUSTING THE MONETARY BASE FOR CHANGES IN RESERVE REQUIREMENTS
In 1977, Burger and Rasche (1977) showed that Brunner' s adjustment for the effects of reserve-requirement ratio changes was inadequate because it did not consider the amount by which past changes in reserve-requirement ratios affected banks' current required reserves. They showed that a suitable adjustment must vary with current deposit levels if it is to remove the total effect of the change in reserve-requirement ratios from the monetary base multiplier (and no more). They proposed that the adjusted monetary base be measured as the sum of the monetary (source) base and a time-varying reserve adjustment magnitude (RAM), a methodology that has generally been maintained in subsequent revisions of the St. Louis adjusted monetary base. 
Monetary Base Multipliers before 1980
We begin with a model that reflects the institutional environment before the Monetary Control Act of 1980. Since our purpose is to illustrate the dependence of the RAM adjustment on the distribution of deposits among different classes of depository institutions, we separate member and nonmember banks more explicitly than have previous authors. 12 We assume (1) a central bank that issues two liabilities, currency, Cu, and reserve balances (that is, deposits at the central bank), RB, and (2) The monetary base multiplier in this model is easily derived. Suppressing time subscripts, the monetary base is by definition
See for example Hancock and Wilcox (1996) .
12 Burger (1971) provides a similar analysis without as explicit a separation of different classes of institutions.
13 Historically, some nonmember banks and thrifts faced stateimposed reserve requirements that had to be satisfied with holdings of vault cash, deposits in other banks, U.S Treasury bills or certain other liquid securities. See Gilbert (1978) , Gambs and Rasche (1978) , and Gilbert and Lovati (1978) . 
Measures of aggregate total and excess reserves published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System omit surplus vault cash and an amount of Federal Reserve deposits equal to depository institutions' required clearing balance contracts.
14 The old reserve measures published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis through September 1996 (discussed in the previous section of this paper) included surplus vault cash but omitted required clearing balance contracts.
The and are the reserve requirement ratios on transaction and time deposits in a chosen base period, respectively. The reserve adjustment magnitude, , maps the change in required reserves due to any change in reserve requirement ratios since the specified base period into an equivalent change in the monetary base.
MB m r r k e t t d v MB
P P D M T M N M D T M M M N 2 1 1 2 = + + = + + ( ) = + + ( ) + + + +           = ( ) , , , , , , , M Cu D k D k r d r t k v e
Similarly, for M2 we have 
15 Recall that only type M institutions are subject to statutory reserve requirements in this model.
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quate indicator variable for the stance of monetary policy.
Adjusting for Reserve Requirement Changes with "Economically Nonbound" Institutions
For periods prior to late 1980, depository institutions are easily separated into two groups based on their holdings of base money: Member banks held vault cash, were subject to Federal Reserve System reserve requirements, and generally held deposits at Federal Reserve Banks; nonmember banks and thrifts held vault cash and were not eligible to hold deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.
Studies of the adjusted monetary base prior to 1980 generally assumed that member banks changed their holdings of base money about dollar-for-dollar following changes in their required reserves due to changes in reserve-requirement ratios. During that period, member banks held few excess reserves, and most banks likely faced reserve-requirement ratios sufficiently high to constrain their portfolio allocation decisions. 16 The use of Federal Reserve deposits to settle interbank payments was little discussed. The general assumption among economists and banking analysts seemed to be that either banks' deposits at Federal Reserve Banks were more than adequate to absorb debits and originate payments, or that the Federal Reserve would supply adequate intraday credit. Banks also had very limited ability to alter their demand for base money by inducing customers to shift funds from transaction to nontransaction deposits. Time deposits, with the exception of large negotiable certificates of deposit, were subject to effective Regulation Q interest rate ceilings. Overall, both banks and their customers likely were sufficiently constrained that other multiplier components (such as the ratio of time and savings deposits to transaction deposits, or t) were unaffected by changes in legal reserverequirement ratios on deposits.
Under this regime, the total amount of base money demanded by depositories equaled the sum of member banks' required and excess reserves, plus the vault cash held by other depositories. Because member banks applied essentially all their vault cash to satisfy reserve requirements, and because required clearing balances were approximately zero, excess reserves at member banks equaled the difference between their deposits at Federal Reserve Banks (denoted as RB) and the portion of their required reserves not satisfied by vault cash:
(Note that RB denotes both the reserve balances and total Federal Reserve Bank deposits held by member banks; without required clearing balance contracts, these are exactly the same.) Excess reserves for the banking system as a whole equaled the sum of excess reserves at member banks plus vault cash at nonmember banks, VC N . The average aggregate excess reserve ratio was Today' s environment is considerably different. The Monetary Control Act extended reserve requirements to all depository institutions, reduced to zero required reserves on savings and personal time deposits, and significantly reduced other reserve requirements on member banks. During December 1990 and January 1991, reserve-requirement ratios on nonpersonal time deposits and Eurodollar liabilities were reduced to zero for all depository institutions. In April 1992, reserve-requirement ratios on transaction deposits were reduced to 10 percent from 12 percent.
17 Depository institutions also gained greater freedom to adjust their mix of reservable and nonreservable deposits during the 1980s, following the end of Regulation Q ceilings on deposit offering rates.
Following implementation of the Monetary Control Act, many depository institutions found that their vault cash, although largely held for retail business reasons, also satisfied their reserve requirements. 18 In the Federal Reserve System, depository institutions that fully satisfy
16 In 1977, required reserve ratios at member banks ranged from a minimum of 7 percent on the first two million of net demand deposits to 16.25 percent on net demand deposits in excess of 400 million dollars. The required reserve ratio on savings deposits was 3 percent and the reserve requirements on time deposits maturing in less than 180 days were 3 percent on the first $5 million and 6 percent on time deposits in excess of $5 million. (Federal Reserve Bulletin, December, 1977, p. A9) 17 In 1995, the reserve requirement ratio on the first $3.8 million of net transaction deposits was zero (the reserve exemption amount), and only 3 percent on the next $51 million (the low reserve tranche). The cutoff for the low reserve tranche is changed annually.
18 Reserve requirements were increased from zero on all nonmember depository institutions. The full imposition of reserve requirements on these institutions was phased in over the period between 1981 and 1987. their required reserves with vault cash are known as "nonbound" institutions; other institutions are known as "bound" institutions. In this article, we refer to these institutions as L-Nonbound and L-Bound, respectively. B) . The 1990-91 reduction in reserverequirement ratios increased the proportion of total deposits at L-Nonbound weekly reporting institutions to about 27 percent in 1991.
We regard L-Nonbound institutions as facing no effective reserve requirementrelated constraint because they seem unlikely to change the asset mix of their portfolios following a change in statutory reserve requirements. L-Nonbound institutions satisfy their required reserves with vault cash, and we assume that their holdings of vault cash are determined almost entirely by business needs, rather than by statutory reserve requirements. As a result, these institutions seem unlikely to change their portfolio mix of assets in response to a change in reserve-requirement ratios.
Vault cash held by L-Nonbound depository institutions in excess of their required reserves is known as "surplus vault cash." Surplus vault cash is "surplus" only in the sense that some part of the bank' s vault cash is not used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements. No statutory requirement determines a depository' s vault cash; these amounts are voluntarily chosen by the institutions' managers. As such, they presumably reflect anticipated business of the institution, and hence are not surplus in the economic sense of indicating a portfolio disequilibrium. Surplus vault cash is included in both the old and new St. Louis' measures of the adjusted monetary base, and in the Board of Governors' measure of the monetary base, not adjusted for reserve requirement changes and not seasonally adjusted. It is excluded, however, from the Board of Governors' measure of the monetary base, adjusted for changes in reserve requirements.
Historical data on surplus vault cash are shown in Figure 2 ( decisions. In this article, we denote such economically-nonbound institutions as ENonbound, and other institutions-for which reserve requirements are binding in the traditional sense of constraining their asset portfolio choices-as E-Bound. How might the portfolio reactions of E-Bound and E-Nonbound institutions to changes in reserve-requirement ratios differ? The depository institutions' ordinary business somewhat restricts their responses. Generally, an institution must maintain adequate stocks of vault cash to convert customer deposits into currency on request, and of Federal Reserve Bank deposits to originate and absorb interbank payments. However, both constraints are somewhat flexible. There is an intraday market in vault cash, at least within larger cities, suggesting that a bank might ask a customer who is seeking a large amount of cash to wait until later in the day, when adequate currency can be obtained from the Federal Reserve or from a correspondent. Some banks require customers who are planning to withdraw a significant amount of currency to provide at least one business day' s notice. It also is not uncommon for ATM machines to run out of currency. For Federal Reserve Bank deposits, there is a national secondary market, the federal funds market. For interbank payments, the Federal Reserve may delay an interbank payment if it exceeds applicable daylight or overnight overdraft limitations. Because a failure to convert a deposit into currency or to make a requested interbank payment may damage a customer relationship, a depository cannot be indifferent to its mix of vault cash and Federal Reserve Bank deposits.
The economic distinction between EBound and E-Nonbound institutions is illustrated by the response of their excessreserve ratio to changes in reserve-requirement ratios. For E-Bound institutions, changes in reserve-requirement ratios, within the range where the requirement remains a constraint on the institutions' portfolios, will induce the institutions to match changes in required reserves with dollar-for-dollar changes in base money. As a result, excess reserves (base money held in excess of statutory requirements) will be approximately unchanged. If all depository institutions are E-Bound, then a change in reserve-requirement ratios will leave the aggregate excess reserve ratio, e, almost unaffected. The best-known historical example of this type of portfolio adjustment is member banks' reaction to the 1936-37 increase in reserve-requirement ratios. Contrary to expectations of Federal Reserve officials, member banks' excess reserve ratios did not fall sharply following the increases.
20 Surplus deposits at Federal Reserve Banks, excess in the sense that they were not applied to satisfy statutory required reserves, were in fact an optimal portfolio choice by member banks; the deposits were not excess in any economic sense. The reserve-requirement ratios of 1935 were effective constraints on the banking system, with almost all member banks E-Bound.
In contrast, consider the portfolio response of E-Nonbound depository institutions to a change in reserve-requirement ratios that leaves the institutions ENonbound after the change. The institu- 
Surplus Vault Cash
Jan 55 tions' business needs, not legal reserve ratios, are the primary determinant of their base money holdings. The excess reserves of E-Nonbound institutions will vary approximately dollar-for-dollar but in the opposite direction to the change in required reserves, leaving total base money holdings largely unaffected. The behaviors of surplus vault cash and required clearing balance contracts after the 1990-91 and 1992 changes in reserve requirement ratios suggest that a substantial proportion of depository institutions are E-Nonbound. Surplus vault cash, shown in Figure 2 , increased sharply in 1991 after reserve-requirement ratios were reduced to zero from 3 percent on nonpersonal time deposits and Eurodollar liabilities. This increase suggests that at least some depository institutions with surplus vault cash were E-Nonbound during 1990. More dramatic perhaps was the sharp increase in required clearing balance contracts, shown in Figure 1 .
Although almost all E-Bound institutions reduced their holdings of Federal Reserve Bank deposits after the reduction in reserve-requirement ratios, some found that attempts to match the reduction in their required reserves with a dollar-for-dollar decrease in their Federal Reserve deposits caused an unacceptable increase in the probability that they might experience either an overnight overdraft or exceed their regulatory cap on daylight overdrafts.
21 This increase also was likely due, at least in part, to depository institutions' recognition that Federal Reserve Bank deposits no longer needed to satisfy statutory reserve requirements could be used to satisfy required clearing balance contracts. Note that the 1991 surge in required clearing balance contracts occurred after several years of stability in the amount of such balances.
The aggregate data on required clearing balance contracts also are consistent, at least in part, with the alternative hypothesis that some part of required clearing balances is held primarily to defray the cost of Federal Reserve priced services. Clearing balances surged during 1991 and 1992 as growth of the monetary base accelerated and the federal funds rate fell, and they decreased sharply during 1994 as growth of the base slowed and the federal funds rate rose. Although some institutions likely adjust the size of their clearing balance contracts inversely with respect to changes in the federal funds rate, the changes in 1991 seem too large to be primarily a reaction to a lower federal funds rate.
If E-Nonbound institutions represent a significant share of the monetary base held by depository institutions, it is important to separate them from E-Bound institutions when measuring RAM. To make the analysis more precise, consider an economy with two distinct groups of depository institutions, both subject to Federal Reserve System reserve requirements. Define economic excess reserves as 
The analysis of this section suggests that a similar decomposition between E-Bound and E-Nonbound institutions would be useful for the period since implementation of the MCA. In obvious notation, the monetary base may be written as .
The appropriate RAM for inclusion in the adjusted monetary base is then , where and denote the statutory reserve-requirement ratios on demand and time deposits, respectively, during the base period of the RAM adjustment. 22 Note that this RAM includes only deposits at E-Bound institutions. In all essential aspects, the treatment of E-Nonbound institutions in this RAM is analogous to the treatment of nonmember banks in Burger and Rasche (1977) .
The adjusted monetary base may be written as
AMB = MBϩRAM
The adjusted monetary base multiplier is By assumption, e EB does not change when or changes because E-Bound institutions match reductions in their required reserves due to changes in statutory reserve-requirement ratios about dollar-for-dollar with reductions in their holdings of base money. In contrast, e EN is assumed to change when or changes so as to leave the second term in the denominator ( ) unchanged.
To measure accurately this post-Monetary Control Act RAM, it is necessary to determine the time-varying fractions of transaction deposits, ␦ EB , and time deposits, EB , at E-Bound depository institutions. These fractions cannot be identified in aggregate data; they must be obtained from data on individual financial institutions. Later in this article we present a statistical analysis of individual bank data that allows us to develop criteria for separating E-Bound and E-Nonbound institutions. Some of the results of that analysis are shown in Figures 3 and 4 , and in Table 2 . The estimated number of E-Bound depository institutions, shown in Figure 3 , fell by 80 percent, to about 500 institutions, following the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements.
The proportions of transaction and nontransaction deposits at E-Bound institutions, shown in Figure 4 , fell from peaks in 1990 to approximately 65 and 54 percent, respectively, following the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements. (Recall that the reserve-requirement ratio on time and savings deposits was reduced to zero in December 1990.) The rows labeled ENonbound and E-Bound in Table 2 show additional data. In 1995, we estimate that only about 2 percent of U.S. depository institutions were E-Bound-that is, found statutory reserve requirements to be an important determinant of their business decisions. Only deposits at these E-Bound Anderson and Rasche, 1996a) .
Time Deposit Ratios and Reserve Requirement Changes
Our discussion of RAM has focused to this point on the direct impact of changes in reserve-requirement ratios on the monetary base multiplier, assuming that the other ratios in the adjusted monetary base multipliers for M1 and M2 are unaffected by changes in the reserve requirement ratios, or that
In the previous section, we showed how, for E-Nonbound institutions, the excess reserve ratio, e, might be a function of r. In this subsection, we explore whether the time deposit ratio, t, might be a function of r.
The end of Regulation Q ceilings on deposit offering rates during the early 1980s gave depository institutions a tool, changes in deposit offering rates, that could in principle be used to adjust their reserve positions by inducing customers to shift among categories of deposits with different reserve-requirement ratios. In a competitive market without legal interest rate ceilings, it seems reasonable to expect that changes in reserve-requirement ratios will affect the rates offered by E-Bound institutions on different types of deposits. Further, it seems reasonable that economic agents will base decisions about the proportion of their wealth to hold in the form of time deposits, in part, on the rates of return offered on time deposits. If so, following implementation of the Monetary Control Act, competitive pressures may have caused increases in offering rates on savings and time deposits, relative to those on transaction deposits. Similarly, the December 1990-January 1991 reduction to zero of reserve requirements on nonpersonal time deposits may have increased offering rates on large negotiable CDs relative to other instruments. Both events may have increased the ratio of time deposits to transaction deposits at E-Bound institutions, EB , that enters the adjusted monetary base multiplier. Testing for a shift in the time deposit ratio circa 1980 is difficult, due to Regulation Q controls. Data from the latter period (1990-91) suggest, however, that banks do not alter their offering rates in response to substantial changes in reserve requirements. The spreads between rates on large negotiable CDs and on Treasury bills and commercial paper are shown in Figure 5 . Although there is considerable variability from week to week, there is no discernible trend. The spread of CD rates over threeand six-month Treasury bill rates fluctuates around 50 basis points; the spread of CD rates over commercial paper rates fluctuates around zero. Neither has any discernible spikes or shifts at the beginning of 1991 when the reserve-requirement ratio was reduced to zero on nonpersonal time deposits. Hence, we do not include in RAM any adjustment for potential indirect effects of reserve-requirement ratio changes on the multiplier via changes in the timedeposit ratio at E-Bound institutions.
MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE: ARE BANKS BOUND BY RESERVE REQUIREMENTS?
In this section, the reactions of commercial banks to the December 1990-January 1991 and April 1992 reductions in reserve requirement ratios are 23 The multiplier discussed here is for transaction money, M1. Multipliers for the broader measures of money such as zeromaturity money (MzM), M2, and M3 include additional terms in their numerators which, in a more detailed analysis, would be shown as components of the time deposit ratio, t. For examples, see Rasche and Johannes (1985) . examined in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) framework. 24 The analysis seeks to quantify the different reactions of LBound and L-Nonbound banks, of various sizes, to changes in statutory reserverequirement ratios. The goal of the analysis is to develop criteria that distinguish E-Bound from E-Nonbound institutions, consistent with the construction of RAM outlined above. Our data sample consists of commercial banks that reported weekly deposit and reserve levels to the Federal Reserve from mid-1990 through the end of 1992.
To this point in this article, the terms bound (L-Bound) and nonbound (LNonbound) have described the reserve position of an individual bank during a single reserve maintenance period. (Recall that a bank is said to be L-Nonbound if it fully satisfies its required reserves with vault cash.) In this section, we use these terms more broadly. For tractability in statistical analysis, we classify individual banks as being either of type L-Bound or type L-Nonbound according to a specified criterion applied to the bank during a number of reserve maintenance periods. This classification system would be trivial if all institutions, during all reserve maintenance periods, were either L-Bound or L-Nonbound and did not change status. In fact, small and medium size institutions often change categories, being L-Nonbound in periods when retail cash demands are heavy and L-Bound in others; larger banks tend to remain consistently in one category.
In our analysis, we examined three alternative criteria for classifying a bank as type L-Bound: (1) the bank was L-Bound during maintenance periods in the second half of 1992 (1992 H2), regardless of its status in other years; (2) the bank was L-Bound during maintenance periods in 1990 H2, regardless of its status in other years; and, (3) the bank was L-Bound during all maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2. We find that statistical inferences regarding the reaction of banks to changes in statutory reserve requirements are robust to reasonable alternative criteria. Parts A and B of Tables   3, 4 , 5, and 6 show comparative results based on cases (1) and (3), respectively.
Our size groupings are broadly consistent with categories used in other banking studies. Banks classified as L-Bound are subsequently separated into four size classes-small, medium, regional and large -based on net transaction deposits, while L-Nonbound banks are separated into only two: small and medium. There are too few larger L-Nonbound banks for analysis. The Monetary Control Act of 1980 established a tiered system of reserve requirements wherein the first $25 million of net transaction deposits, the "low reserve tranche," was subject to a 3 percent requirement, while larger amounts were subject to a 12 percent requirement. Initially set at $25 million, the low reserve tranche is indexed annually to the change in the aggregate amount of net transaction deposits. We classify banks in our sample data as small if their holdings of net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche during any reserve maintenance period in the second half of 1990 (the low reserve tranche was $41.1 million in 1990). 25 We classify banks as medium-sized if their average level of net transaction deposits during the second half of 1990 was greater than the low reserve tranche but less than $135 million, as regional-sized if their net transaction deposits averaged more than $135 million but less than $500 million, and as large if their net transaction deposits averaged more than $500 million.
Statistical inferences regarding banks' reactions to reserve-requirement changes are robust to reasonable alternative sizeclassification schemes. Use of the low reserve tranche for delineating small banks provides an important control in our analysis, because the April 1992 change in reserve-requirement ratios affected only banks with transaction deposits above the tranche. Results for the medium and regional groups are not sensitive to the precise cut-off selected to separate the groups because there are relatively few banks with net transaction deposits between about $100 to $150 million. The $500 million cut-off places about 150 24 Because of the unsettled state of the thrift industry during this period, we exclude thrifts from the analysis. 25 The Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 created the reserve exemption amount, which is subject to a zero reserve requirement. Originally $2.1 million of deposits, it also is indexed. See Anderson and Kavajecz (1994) In the absence of a fully worked out model of bank reserve management, it is difficult to identify factors that might account for the differing responses of small L-Nonbound and small L-Bound to the 1990-91 changes in reserve-requirement ratios. In contrast, the 1992 reduction in the reserve-requirement ratio on net transaction deposits affected (algebraically) only larger institutions with net transaction deposits above approximately $42 million. The reduction had no effect on banks subject to only a 3 percent marginal reserve requirement, and only a weak effect on medium-sized banks that faced a 12 percent requirement on only a part of their transaction deposits.
• Larger L-Bound banks responded strongly to the 1990-91 reduction and somewhat less strongly to the 1992 reduction. These banks chose to satisfy their required reserves by holding relatively large amounts of Federal Reserve Bank deposits. In general, these amounts are more than what is necessary for the banks' paymentsrelated activities, such as check clearing and wire transfer. If statutory reserve requirements are binding for any group of banks, it must be for these.
Our models seek to estimate the response of banks' base money holdings to changes in reserve requirements. Measuring the amount of base money held by some nonmember institutions is problematic, however. While all banks in our data report their daily holdings of vault cash to the Federal Reserve, some nonmember banks do not hold Federal Reserve deposits in their own name; rather, they hold them indirectly via a passthrough contract with a correspondent bank. 27 In addition, some nonmember banks hold Federal Reserve deposits both indirectly (through a correspondent) and directly (in their own account). We increased the Federal Reserve deposits reported by banks with passthrough reserve arrangements by an amount equal to the difference between the bank' s required reserves and its applied vault cash. At the same time, we reduced each correspondent bank' s reported Federal Reserve deposits by the amount of its respondent banks' required reserves charged against the correspondent' s Federal Reserve account. Given the data reported by banks to the Federal Reserve, this is the only feasible method for measuring the amount of Federal Reserve deposits held (indirectly) by banks with passthrough reserve contracts.
Summary statistics for our sample of banks are shown in Part A of Table 3 shows that the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements on nonpersonal time and savings deposits reduced required reserves at small, medium, regional and large banks by about 44 percent, 19 percent, 17 percent and 18 percent, respectively, after allowing for increases in their net transactions deposits. On average, these banks satisfied about one-half of their required reserves with vault cash (column 4). 31 Contracted clearing balances increased sharply from 1990 to 1992, approximately doubling for the smallest banks and increasing by almost an order of magnitude for large banks.
A Traditional Fixed Effects ANOVA Model
In Table 4 (see The dummy variables index the relative position of reserve maintenance period j within the year, with the first period in July of each year numbered "1" and the last period of the year numbered "13". As such, they absorb seasonal fluctuations that may differ in strength across banks. We interpret the as representing the effects of changes in reserve requirements between 1990, 1991, and 1992, although as dummy variables they may also pick up other year-specific effects. Estimates presented in Parts A and B of Table 4 28 Our sample may underrepresent small depository institutions that are not required to report data weekly to the Federal Reserve. We assume that virtually all of these institutions would be classified as economically nonbound and excluded from the calculation of RAM. For a discussion of Federal Reserve data reporting requirements, see Anderson and Kavajecz (1994) . 29 Banks that acquire other depository institutions are permitted under the Federal Reserve's Regulation D to phase out, during the following eight quarters, the benefit of the acquired institution's low reserve tranche. All banks involved in such acquisitions are excluded from our statistical analysis. Such banks are included in the calculation of RAM, where we allow for this effect by adjusting the size of the tranche loss adjustment to reflect the size of the tranche in the base period, January 7, 1991; see Anderson and Rasche (1996a) . 30 The overall sample size also is smaller in Part B because 13 regional and large L-Bound banks in Part A are reclassified as L-Nonbound in Part B, and dropped from the analysis. 1 Classifications are based on banks' legal reserve status in 1992 H2 and on their size in 1990 H2. Banks are classified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in one or more reserve maintenance periods during 1992 H2; if not, they are classified as L-Nonbound. Banks are classified as small if their net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during 1990 H2, and are classified as medium or regional if their average level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500 million, respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classified as large. 2 Banks are classified as L-Bound if they were legally bound in all reserve maintenance periods in 1990 H2, 1991 H2 and 1992 H2; if not, they are classified as LNonbound. Banks are classified as small if their net transaction deposits did not exceed the low reserve tranche ($40.4 million) in any reserve maintenance period during 1990 H2, and are classified as medium or regional if their average level of net transaction deposits during 1990 H2 did not exceed $125 million or $500 million, respectively. Banks with net transaction deposits averaging more than $500 million during 1990 H2 are classified as large. Small L-Bound banks. The model estimates suggest a strong response by small L-Bound banks to the 1990-91 reduction in reserve requirements. The reasonableness of the estimated ANOVA regression coefficients can be judged by comparing them to estimates calculated from the summary statistics shown in Table 3 , under the null hypothesis that the banks are E-Bound-that is, that the banks' reductions in their holdings of base money will match, dollar-for-dollar, the decrease in their required reserves. Approximately half of the required reserves of these banks in 1990 was due to net transaction deposits ($620 million), and about half was due to nontransaction deposits. Each category of deposits was subject to a 3 percent marginal requirement. Ignoring the zero reserve requirement on the reserve exemption amount, the reduction to zero of the reserve-requirement ratio on nonpersonal time and savings deposits might reduce the banks' average ratio of base money to net transaction deposits by about one-half of its 1990 value of 0.056, or 0.028. The estimated ANOVA effect equals the estimated coefficient on the 1990 year dummy variable less the coefficient on the 1991 year dummy variable, or (λ 90 Ϫλ 91 ) = 0.021Ϫ 0.001 = 0.02.
Both ˆλ 90 and ˆλ 91 are estimated relative to 1992 because is omitted from the regression. The size of ANOVA effect is close to, but slightly smaller than, the effect calculated from the summary statistics.
The regression coefficient for 1991, λ 91 , measures small L-Bound banks' reaction to the April 1992 reduction in the marginal reserve requirement on net transaction deposits to10 percent from 12 percent. Because these banks' net transaction deposits were below the low reserve tranche, their required reserves were unaffected by the change. The estimated ANOVA effect, 0.0006, is about zero, as expected.
Medium L-Bound Banks.
The results for medium-sized L-Bound banks are similar to those for small L-Bound banks. As above, we can judge the reasonableness of the estimated ANOVA effect by calculating a preliminary estimate from the summary statistics in Table 3 , under the null hypothesis that the banks are E-Bound both before and after the change in the legal requirements. About three-fourths of the required reserves of these banks were due to net transaction deposits in 1990, and their total required reserves averaged about 8.1 percent of their net transaction deposits. Thus, reducing to zero the reserve requirement on nonpersonal time and savings deposits seems likely to reduce by about one-fourth their overall ratio of required reserves and base money holdings relative to net transaction deposits, a decrease of about 0.02.
The estimated ANOVA effect of the 1990 reduction equals the coefficient on the 1990 year dummy less the coefficient on the 1991 year dummy variable, or (λ 90 Ϫλ 91 ) = 0.0167Ϫ0.0034 = 0.013.
The effect is economically significant, although smaller in size than our preliminary estimate which assumed that the reduction in base money holdings would match, dollar-for-dollar, the decrease in required reserves.
The estimated effect of the 1992 reduction is only 0.0034. While statistically significant with such a large sample, it is less than one-sixth of the 0.02 change in the marginal statutory reserve requirement ratio. This estimate suggests that banks in this size range reduced their holdings of Federal Reserve deposits little, if at all, following the decrease in the reserve-requirement ratio. There is some evidence of a smaller response by banks that had required clearing balance contracts. This difference seems consistent with our conjecture that required clearing balances are, for some banks at least, a low-cost type of excess reserves. Further, banks with required clearing balance contracts likely are purchasing paymentsrelated services from the Federal Reserve and need sufficient Federal Reserve deposits to avoid overdrafts. Overall, for small and medium LBound banks, the estimated responses to the 1990-91 reduction are economically significant, while responses to the 1992 reduction are not. The insignificance of the latter coefficient for small banks is expected, since their marginal reserve ratio remained unchanged at 3 percent. While the 1992 year effect for the medium L-Bound banks is statistically significantly greater than zero, its small size makes it difficult to attribute the effect to changes in the marginal reserve requirement ratio. In part, the estimated effect may reflect banks' reaction to the lower federal funds rate that prevailed during 1992, relative to 1991. Below, we compare these responses to those of similar L-Nonbound banks.
As a result of this analysis, small and medium-size L-Bound depository institutions are assumed to have been E-Bound prior to January 1991 and are included in RAM through December 1990, but are assumed to have become E-Nonbound in January 1991 and are thereafter excluded from RAM. With the exclusion of these depository institutions, only about 5-1/2 percent of weekly reporting institutions, and 2 percent of all institutions (see Table 2 ), are included in the revised RAM adjustment for the St. Louis adjusted monetary base.
Regional and Large L-Bound Banks. On balance, regional and large L-Bound banks are estimated to have responded significantly to both the 1990-91 and 1992 reductions; in other words, they were EBound. Preliminary estimates of the reductions' effects may be calculated, as above, from Table 3 . Required reserves held against net transaction deposits were about 83 percent of these banks' total required reserves in 1990, and their ratios of total required reserves to net transaction deposits were about 12.2 and 13.9 percent, respectively. If the 1990-91 reductions in required reserves were reflected fully in reduced holdings of base money, we would project an effect of more than 0.02. The estimated ANOVA effect for regional banks is In contrast, these banks seem to have reduced their holdings of base money less than proportionately, following the April 1992 reduction in reserve requirements. The estimated coefficients, λ 92 , for regional and large banks-0.0128 and 0.0128, respectively-are significantly greater than zero statistically and less than the 0.02 reduction in the marginal statutory requirement. Again, banks with required clearing balance contracts are estimated to have reduced their holdings of base money less than other banks. The lower federal funds rate during 1992 likely attenuated the reduction in Federal Reserve deposits that otherwise would have followed the reserve-requirement reduction. In addition, the smaller estimated coefficient (relative to the statutory change of 0.02) likely reflects some large banks becoming E-Nonbound after the 1990-91 and 1992 reductions.
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Small and Medium-Size L-Nonbound Banks. Estimates for L-Nonbound banks suggest economically insignificant responses to changes in reserve requirements since 1990. Table 3 ' s summary statistics show that required reserves held against nontransaction deposits were about 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively, of the total required reserves held by these banks in 1990. The average aggregate ratios of required reserves to net transaction deposits at these banks were 4.1 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively, suggesting that these banks' ratios of base money to net transaction deposits might decrease by as much as 1.8 percent. The estimated ANOVA effects of the reduction-0.005 for small banks and 0.003 for medium bank-are fairly similar and less than one-third of the pre- Table 5 . 33 Although Parts A and B of Table 5 show estimates under the same alternative L-Bound classification criteria used in Tables 3 and 4 , we limit our discussion to Part A. Figures 6-8 are based on the regressions summarized in Part A of Table 5 .
The null hypothesis that there was no change in the behavior of y ijt across 1990, 1991, and 1992 is easily rejected by the Fstatistics reported in Table 5 . The estimated responses of individual small, medium, regional and large L-Bound banks to the 1990-91 reduction in reserverequirement ratios are shown, respectively, in panels A and C of 34 Medium-size L-Bound banks averaged about $80 million in net transaction deposits (see Table 3 ), the first $3.6 million subject to a zero reserve requirement ratio, the next $38.6 million to a 3 percent ratio and, before the April 1992 reduction, the balance to a 12 percent ratio. Figure 7 ), the ratio fell about 1-1/2 percentage points, close to what would be projected from their average net transaction deposits of about $280 million (see Table 3 cash, we anticipated little reaction to the reductions in reserve-requirement ratios.
Although there is some variety in effects for individual banks, the distributions for L-Nonbound banks generally are symmetric about zero, for both the 1990-91 changes (panels A and C) and the 1992 change (panels B and D).
Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance
The panel, or longitudinal, structure of our data requires attention to the implied covariance structure of the datagenerating process. Each bank in our sample is observed for 13 reserve maintenance periods in each of three years, 1990, 1991, and 1992 . As such, it seems unlikely that the disturbances in our ANOVA models, ε ijt , are independent and identically distributed. If they are not, the coefficient estimates are unbiased and inefficient, while the estimated covariance matrix is biased and inconsistent. An appropriate covariance structure likely would be block-diagonal, with a separate block for each bank. A test for the responses of depository institutions which incorporates this block-diagonal covariance structure may be constructed by viewing the banks as if they were clinical subjects engaged in a laboratory experiment. It is commonplace in clinical studies to measure certain characteristics of subjects both pre-and post-treatment, asking whether the change in the measurement for each subject, when averaged across all subjects, is statistically significant. Since there are multiple observations on each subject, the models are widely referred to as repeated measures models. 35 In these models, the repeated observations for each subject are treated as multiple time series, and the disturbance is assumed to be multivariate normal. In our data, we observe the ratio of base money to net transaction deposits for each bank during thirteen reserve maintenance periods in each of three years: 1990, 1991 and 1992. In the repeated measures ANOVA, the observations for each year are treated as thirteen realizations of a single time series process; pooled across the three years, the observations are regarded as a multiple time series process composed of three univariate processes. The data for 35 See Crowder and Hand (1990) , Diggle, Liang and Zeger (1994) , or Davidian and Giltinan (1995) . An earlier reference is Hsiao (1986) . test shown in the table is based on an estimated single-equation regression that includes interaction effects between the reserve-maintenance period dummy variables and the year dummy variables (for 1990 and 1991, relative to 1992 36 These confidence intervals are plotted as horizontal line segments in Figures 9 and 10. The length of each line segment shows the width of the confidence interval, the numbers on the vertical axis index the reserve maintenance period j, and the means D •jt are indicated by the large dots on each line. We show the confidence intervals graphically (rather than reporting significance levels or pvalues for rejection/acceptance of the null hypothesis of no response to a change in the reserve requirement ratio) because inferences drawn from a graphical presentation likely are more robust to deviations from the regularity conditions that justify use of the (asymptotic) t-distribution in construction of the intervals. A graphical presentation also is somewhat easier to interpret than classical test statistics when between-bank, within-group variances are small, as reflected in the short length of the confidence intervals. Nonbound institutions did not respond. Of special interest is the confidence interval for the change between the thirteenth reserve maintenance periods in 1990 and in 1991. The reserve-requirement reduction was phased in, with only one-half of the reduction in force during the final reserve maintenance period of 1990. EBound banks would be expected to respond to the phased reduction by displaying a smaller response for this thirteenth period than for the other twelve periods. Such a response is distinct for L-Bound banks and absent for L-Nonbound banks. We conclude that: (1) L-Nonbound depository institutions likely were E-Nonbound before the 1990-91 reduction, and hence should be excluded from RAM; and (2) L-Bound institutions generally were E-Bound, and responded as expected to the reduction in requirements. Figure 10 shows similar intervals for the April 1992 reduction in reserve requirements. Small and medium-size L-Nonbound and L-Bound banks did not respond: their confidence intervals either include, or are very close to, the origin. Although larger L-Bound banks reduced their holdings of base money, on average their response was less than the 0.02 reduction in the statutory requirement. The less-than-proportionate response perhaps reflects the falling federal funds rate; it might also be signalling, however, that the banks were becoming, or had become, E-Nonbound. The latter hypothesis is supported by the observation that, by the end of 1992, about half of these banks had agreed, through required clearing balance contracts, to maintain Federal Reserve deposits in excess of amounts necessary to satisfy their statutory reserve requirements. We conclude that by the end of 1992 only a small number of U.S. depository institutions found statutory reserve requirements governing their demand for base money. 
